For more than two centuries, Switzerland symbolised the possibility that neutrality could serve both as a moral principle and as an effective foreign policy. Today, that certainty has faded. The geopolitical consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the intensifying strategic rivalry between the United States and China, and the gradual fragmentation of the international order have made neutrality increasingly difficult to sustain. In a world that rewards alignment, remaining equidistant has become an exception rather than the rule.
Against this backdrop, ASEAN’s diplomatic doctrine appears remarkably resilient. While major powers encourage countries to choose sides, Southeast Asia continues to defend a different model based on dialogue, consensus and strategic autonomy. Rather than avoiding international engagement, ASEAN seeks to preserve its ability to engage with every relevant actor without becoming dependent on any of them. Its objective is not neutrality in the traditional European sense, but balance through engagement.
The recent Kazan Declaration between ASEAN and Russia should be understood in that context. It does not represent a geopolitical shift towards Moscow, but reflects a longstanding diplomatic philosophy centred on inclusiveness and dialogue. The same approach explains why ASEAN simultaneously deepens relations with the United States, China, Japan, the European Union, India and Russia. Maintaining multiple partnerships is not a contradiction; it is the essence of its foreign policy.
This strategy rests on three principles that have guided ASEAN for decades: centrality, inclusiveness and non-alignment. Together, they have enabled the organisation to remain a relevant platform for regional dialogue despite growing competition between the world’s largest powers. Rather than becoming an arena for geopolitical confrontation, ASEAN continues to present itself as a forum where competing interests can still coexist.
That approach is increasingly valuable at a time when international politics is once again being organised around rival blocs. Strategic autonomy is not always the fastest or simplest path, and ASEAN itself faces internal differences and external pressures. Yet its experience demonstrates that influence does not necessarily depend on military strength or ideological alignment. Sometimes it derives from maintaining credibility as a reliable interlocutor for all parties.
The coming years will test that model. Rivalry between Washington and Beijing is unlikely to diminish, while Russia’s international role remains highly contested. Preserving cohesion among ten member states with different strategic priorities will become progressively more demanding. Nevertheless, abandoning the principles that have defined ASEAN for more than half a century would risk weakening precisely the diplomatic capital that has allowed the organisation to remain relevant.
If Switzerland represented the ideal of twentieth-century neutrality, ASEAN may well be shaping a distinctly twenty-first-century concept of strategic autonomy. Its ambition is not to remain detached from global affairs, but to ensure that Southeast Asia retains the freedom to determine its own future. In an increasingly polarised international system, that may prove to be one of the region’s greatest diplomatic strengths.
